USA v. Michael Durante by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-9-2017 
USA v. Michael Durante 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Michael Durante" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 442. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/442 
This May is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 16-2871 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL F. DURANTE, 
                               Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. No. 2-11-cr-00277-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Stanley R. Chesler 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 6, 2017 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, SCIRICA and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: May 9, 2017) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
A jury convicted Michael Durante of one count of conspiracy to distribute 
oxycodone and fifteen counts of distribution of oxycodone. In this appeal, Durante 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
 2 
 
challenges the District Court’s denial of his motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 33 based on an alleged violation of Brady v. Maryland.1 For the 
reasons stated below, we will affirm. 
I. 
Durante was a physician with a practice in New Jersey. A federal sting operation 
revealed that he had been illegally selling prescriptions for oxycodone to two drug-
distribution networks: one run by codefendant Andre Domando, and one by codefendant 
Dennis Abato. After Durante’s arrest, Abato cooperated with the Government. During his 
proffer sessions, Abato told the prosecutor that a third party altered (“washed”) Durante’s 
prescriptions when necessary, and he produced a prescription from Durante dated four 
days after Durante’s arrest. After determining that the prescription was not actually 
written by Durante, the prosecutor emailed Durante’s counsel a copy of the prescription, 
noted that it appeared to be altered, and invited counsel to review the original.  
At trial, the prescription from Abato’s proffer session was admitted into evidence. 
Neither the Government nor Durante called Abato as a witness. The Government did, 
however, call Abato’s son Jeffrey. On direct examination, Jeffrey recognized Durante’s 
handwriting on multiple prescriptions. On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned 
Jeffrey about the prescription from Abato’s proffer session. Jeffrey testified that the 
handwriting on the prescription “appear[ed] to have some of [his] father’s 
                                              
1 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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characteristics.”2 Ultimately, the jury found Durante guilty. Durante unsuccessfully 
appealed his conviction.3 
Abato pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute oxycodone. Prior to 
his sentencing, the Government submitted a U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 letter to reflect Abato’s 
cooperation in Durante’s prosecution. At Abato’s sentencing hearing, the prosecutor 
discussed the submission and stated: 
[O]ne of the things that we detail is the fact that [Abato] told us that he had 
these prescriptions and he received them on the roadside from Durante after 
his arrest. And that [disclosure] was about a year after the arrest. And what 
it appears he was doing was covering up the fact that, presumably because 
of his addiction or other reasons, he had washed prescriptions and changed 
ordinary prescriptions and submitted them to pharmacies about a year 
earlier. 
So, in the next session he presented us with one of these 
prescriptions that he had done a poor job of washing and apparently that’s 
why it was never presented to a pharmacy as kind of evidence of, you 
know, what he was doing.4 
The court then asked the prosecutor to clarify that Abato “wasn’t telling [the 
prosecutor] this was a washed prescription. He was telling [the prosecutor] this 
was a prescription which, in fact, Dr. Durante issued to [Abato] for the narcotic,” 
to which the prosecutor responded, “Yes. . . . You only needed to look at it for a 
                                              
2 Suppl. App. 148:70.  
3 United States v. Durante, 612 F. App’x 129 (3d Cir. 2015).  
4 Suppl. App. 174-75.  
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minute and then you could clearly see it, as the defense counsel effectively 
displayed [to] the jury that it had been washed.”5  
 Arguing that the prosecutor’s statements at Abato’s sentencing hearing 
showed that the Government violated Brady by withholding “evidence that Abato 
had admitted forging prescriptions and filling those forgeries,” Durante moved for 
a new trial under Rule 33.6 The District Court held a Rule 33 hearing and 
ultimately denied the motion. The court determined that no Brady evidence had 
been suppressed and that the alleged nondisclosure was immaterial to Durante’s 
guilt. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 3231. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. When a Rule 33 motion for a new trial is 
based on a Brady claim, we review questions of law de novo and questions of fact 
for clear error.7 
III. 
Rule 33 states that “the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the 
interest of justice so requires.”8 In order to show that the interest of justice requires a new 
trial under Brady, Durante must show that “(1) evidence was suppressed; (2) the 
                                              
5 Suppl. App. 175-76.  
6 App. 33. 
7 United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2005).  
8 Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a).  
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suppressed evidence was favorable to the defense; and (3) the suppressed evidence was 
material either to guilt or to punishment.”9  
Durante’s claim fails on the first prong. He has not shown that evidence was 
suppressed under Brady. The prosecutor prefaced his statements at Abato’s sentencing 
hearing by saying, “what it appears [Abato] was doing was covering up the fact that” he 
altered prescriptions.10 And at the Rule 33 hearing, the prosecutor testified that at the time 
of trial, the Government had “no information as to whether Dennis Abato truly was 
involved in washing prescriptions. He always denied it. His son implicated him but he 
denied it.”11 The prosecutor’s testimony is plausible because had Abato admitted to 
altering or filling altered prescriptions, he would not have needed to cover up that fact. 
Moreover, the record is devoid of support for Durante’s claim that the prosecutor’s 
statements at Abato’s sentencing hearing were based on evidence that was not disclosed 
to Durante’s counsel. At the Rule 33 hearing, Durante conceded that the Government 
made multiple pretrial disclosures related to the substance of Abato’s proffer sessions 
and, specifically, of washed prescriptions pertaining to Abato. It is plausible that the 
prosecutor questioned the veracity of Abato’s claimed innocence based on Abato’s 
inconsistent disclosures regarding his role in the conspiracy and his counsel’s concession 
that Abato was still using narcotics when he began cooperating with the government. 
                                              
9 Pelullo, 399 F.3d at 209. 
10 Suppl. App. 148:70 (emphasis added).  
11 App. 69:10.  
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Finally, not only did the prosecutor disclose his suspicion that the prescription that Abato 
produced in the proffer session was altered, but, Abato’s son also testified that the 
handwriting on that prescription bore similar characteristics to his father’s handwriting. 
The District Court’s determination that no evidence was suppressed under Brady was 
based on testimony that is “coherent and plausible, not internally inconsistent and not 
contradicted by external evidence.”12 
As we find that no evidence was suppressed under Brady, we need not reach 
Durante’s challenge to the District Court’s determination that the alleged nondisclosure 
was immaterial to Durante’s guilt.13 Because Durante fails to establish a claim under 
Brady, he fails to show that the District Court erred in denying his Rule 33 motion for a 
new trial.  
IV. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm. 
                                              
12 United States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 441 (3d Cir. 1997).  
13 See Pelullo, 399 F.3d at 210. 
